If, due to some catastrophe, our classical communication system is destroyed but quantum entangled state survived, in that entanglement age, it is widely believed, the whole world would be communication less. It is discussed that complete entanglement based communication even with security is possible in that scenario. In this context, the notion of cheating-free Bell's inequality test is introduced.
Not long before, entanglement, the enigmatic feature of quantum correlation [1, 2] , was believed to be useful only to address the interpretational aspect of quantum mechanics. But things have changed after the discovery of quantum cryptography [3] [4] [5] , quantum computation [6] [7] , dense coding [8] and teleportation [9] . Now entanglement is the part and parcel of quantum information.
Deutsch, in his foundational paper on quantum computation, obliquely suggested [6] that quantum entanglement can be used to generate quantum key, discovered by Bennett and Brassard [4] . Bennett and Brassard used disentangled state in their BB84 quantum key distribution (QKD) scheme, so Deutsch's suggestion was striking. Ekert elaborated Deutsch's suggestion and pointed out [5] Bell's theorem [2] can be used to test eavesdropping. Although practical utilization of Bell's theorem is conceptually interesting but it has been soon clear [10] that avoiding Bell's inequality test one can use EPR correlation [1] to detect eavesdropping. Be that as it may, finally it has been settled that EPR and non EPR quantum cryptosystems (i.e. entanglement and disentanglement based systems) are two different kind of system however they have same physical property -the ability to expose clandestine eavesdropping.
Bennett, Brassard and Mermin carried out a comparative study [10] on entanglement and disentanglement based quantum cryptosystems. They concluded that only difference is that random data are jointly chosen by legitimate users in disentanglement based system but in entanglement based system, random data spontaneously originates due to the measurements. In entanglement based cryptosystem key does not exist -not even in the mind of legitimate users until measurement is performed. If sender has no control over the random data arising from entanglement based cryptosystem then it can be assumed that completely entanglement based secure communication is impossible.
But if we are not interested about security can we get completely entanglement based communication ? Such possibility is recently ruled out by Bennett and Divincenzo [11] . They assume: "entanglement by itself can not be used to transmit a classical message". It means entanglement could not produce meaningful data, which is needed to send a classical message over an entirely entanglement based channel. We shall see the above assumptions do not hold good for our information processing technique [12] because entanglement can be manipulated to produce meaningful data. That is, the power of entanglement in quantum information processing is surprisingly underestimated.
Let us recall the technique. The two different sequences of quantum states (say, S 0 and S 1 ) represent bit 0 and 1. The information regarding two sequences is initially secretly shared between the legitimate users. Repeatedly and randomly using these two sequences arbitrarily long string of bits can be generated. Now we shall use entangled state to prepare the two sequences.
Suppose Alice has a personal database which contains meaningful data. She wants to transmit the database to her partner Bob stationed at far off distance only using entangled states. Suppose Alice possesses a stockpile of EPR pairs. The n pairs (n is a moderately large number) can be arranged in two different ways to represent bit 0 and 1. Here "A-a", "B-b", "C-c", "D-d", "E-e" and"F-f" denote EPR pairs.
The quantum key K Q will be : 
The quantum state of the pairs can be describes as, |ψ
, where i and j (i = j) denote the position of any pair in the two arrangements which are not very close to each other. The information regarding the two arrangements (S 0 and S 1 ) is initially secretly shared between them.
If Alice wants to send bit 0 from her database, she arranges n pairs according to S 0 and send that sequence to Bob. Similarly she can send bit 1 by sending S 1 . Bob can easily recover the bit values from the incoming sequences by correlating the shared information regarding the two probable arrangements with the outcome of his sequence of measurements.
Let us describe a simple recovery of the bit value assuming (for clarity) only one type of the sequence is sent by Alice. Bob first receives the sequence of EPR particles and stores them in a quantum memory-cum-register. He sorts out n/2 pairs assuming they belong to S 0 and keep the n/2 pairs in (n/2) × 2 memory array marked 0. The remaining n/2 pairs (say n is even number)are assumed to belong to S 1 and kept in (n/2) × 2 memory array marked 1. At this stage she does not know which identification is right. He measures the spin in vertical direction on EPR pairs ( each pair is kept in a row). If the sequence is S 0 , then the results corresponding to rows of the array marked 0 will be either ↑ and ↓ or ↓ and ↑. But the results, corresponding to the rows of array marked 1, will be four types; 1) ↑ and ↓, 2) ↓ and ↑, 3) ↑ and ↑ 4) ↓ and ↓. As array marked 0 only contains EPR data so bit 0 is recovered. If S 1 is sent then array marked 1 will contain EPR data. Thus Alice can sent bit 0 or 1 according to her wish and Bob can recover the bit values. It means the complete entanglement based communication is possible. Next we shall discuss how this communication can be made secure.
Eavesdropper's problem is identical to what she encountered in our disentanglement based QKD scheme [12] . He/she can not extract the bit value from a single copy of any sequences [13] . As our scheme is based on repetition, eavesdropper, extracting bit values, can evade detection if proper security criterion is not imposed. The security criterion is: bit by bit security. In this criterion, Alice will send the next bit after being informed by Bob that the previous one has not been corrupted by eavesdropper. This test needs two-way communications which simultaneously give authentication [12] . If the bit is not corrupted Bob can inform Alice by sending any of the two sequences. It is not necessary to send back the same bit value sequence what Bob has got.
Note that, if security is not necessary, initial sharing of information is also not needed. Bob can recover the message by correlating the results of randomly incoming identical sequences representing identical bit values. The concept of secret sharing of random data was first introduced by Vernam in classical cryptography [14] . But the problem of that classical code is that the same shared information can not be again and again used. On the other hand, in our scheme, repetition of the quantum sequence is simply possible because each sequence can be made secure by the no-cloning/uncertainty principle.
The above protocol can also be used as three party protocol involving Alice (sender), Bob and Sonu (receivers). In three party protocol each of the two receivers -Bob and Sonu -will get one of the EPR particles of each pair belonging to any of the two arrangements. Let us take an example. The above two arrangements are representing bit 0. Bob is given the first arrangement and Sonu is given the second arrangement. If they co operate, they could recover the bit 0. Similarly their co-operation will be required to recover the bit 1. This is actually entanglement based alternative message splitting [15, 16] protocol.
The encoding is described for two-particle entangled state, although many-particle entangled state can be used. So far security is concerned which type of entangled state should be chosen in a sequence of n particles ? For example: 200 three-particle or 300 two-particle entangled states ? Next we shall discuss that the question is related to an ignored part of security of quantum encryption.
It is said that in quantum encryption, eavesdropper is bound to introduce errors due to no-cloning principle. In strict sense, this statement is incorrect. Eavesdropper has nonzero probability ( but extremely small) of success in guessing the entire encoding. In other words, we can say that quantum states, used for encoding, can be perfectly cloned with non-zero probability by the eavesdropper. Hence eavesdropper can evade detection with some non-zero probability. In quantum fashion, the success of perfect guess can be described as an entanglement of eavesdropper's mind with users' minds. After all quantum mechanics cannot resist two mind beat-ing in unison for a while, since law of probability allows it. If we think the existence of many many eavesdroppers then this guessstrategy may work for one of the eavesdroppers. Then there will be no errors due to the measurements of that eavesdropper. So, we should protect the system against such wild strategy. This is possible because probability of success depends on how many different ways a particular encryption can be executed. For our encryption it simply depends on the permutation of the quantum states. Therefore it is easy to enhance the security (say, inner layer of security) of our encryption. Let us see how many different ways the particles can be arranged. If n is the total number of particles in each sequence and r is the number of particles in an entangled state, the number of distinguishable arrangements (they can be distinguished by measurements if many copies of the same arrangement are given) is n!/r! n/r , where n is a factor of r. Eavesdropper's chance of correct guess is p r = r! n/r /n!. Now we shall see that for fixed n, two-particle entangled state is the best choice to enhance the inner layer of security.
Suppose n particle sequence is composed either by x copies of two-particle entangled states or y copies of r-particle entangled states. Assume, two-particle is the best choice. Then p r /p 2 = r! y /2 x = r! 2x/r /2 x > 1. It follows 2 log r!¿ r log 2. This identity is always true. So two-particle is the best choice. Note that, in classical encryption we do not have this kind of choice. Choice is made due to the indistinguishability of quantum particles forming entanglement. For our encoding the issues like channel capacity, entropy and statistical distinguishability can be further investigated. From Ekert's work it is known that EPR based cryptosystem can be protected by Bell's theorem. But the problem is: violation or no-violation of Bell's inequality is not necessarily mean a genuine test of entanglement. Using disentangled states (BB-84 states [ 
Bell's inequality can be tested [17] . By standard meaning, this is a fake Bell's inequality test. Suppose Bell's inequality is tested by two distant experimentalists. In that case, it is widely believed [18, 20] that there is no way to know whether the test is real or fake because there is no way to know whether they share genuine entangled state or not. If it be so, experimental falsification of hidden variables under Einstein's locality condition [1] is perhaps incomplete to an experimentalist because he/she can be cheated by other remote experimentalist participating in that test [19] . In the cheating case, pseudo hidden variable takes the place of hypothetical local hidden variable. Next we shall discuss that cheating-free test is simply possible.
The problem can be attacked in two ways -the so-called test can be done either by one experimentalist or by two experimentalists described below.:
Cheating free test by one experimentalist: 1. Alice sends a particular sequence of EPR particles to Bob. 2. Taking half of the particles, Bob measures the EPR correlation. 3. If he gets perfect correlation then, with remaining particles he can himself perform the test at two distant corners of a big laboratory.
This protocol can serve as quantum cryptosystem if two shared arrangements of entangled states are used. If two secret arrangements are used then Bob cannot get perfectly correlated EPR data due to eavesdropping even when Alice is honest.
Cheating free test by two distant experimentalists: 1. Alice sends a sequence of EPR particles from each EPR pair to Bob. 2. Bob seeks some of the partner EPR particles from Alice. If he gets perfect correlation in EPR data (statistics should be high), he can trust the other particles. Alice cannot deceive Bob as he does not know which particles (events) will be sought and which basis will be chosen to measure the EPR correlation by Bob. If Alice sends "fake" states in the first round she could not create entangled state in second round. Therefore, genuine EPR states can be shared in this way. (They can use them for secure ideal quantum coin tossing which is also believed to be impossible [20] ). They can proceed for the inequality test with these remaining shared EPR pairs. But there is a loophole. They can cheat each other when they reveal results and basis/angles of measurements. After Alice's discloser of results and angles of measurements, Bob can easily reveal "fake" results and the corresponding "fake" angles of measurements with out going through any measurements in order to show violation or no violation of Bell's inequality to Alice. Same thing Alice can do if Bob reveals results first. Cheating -free test can be executed by additional steps.
After being sure they share genuine entangled states, the protocol can be extended in the following manner: 5. Alice will ask Bob to reveal the results and basis of measurements of half of his genuine particles. 6. Bob meets the demand of Alice. 7. Getting the information from Bob, Alice chooses some particles to test the EPR correlation. 8. If she gets perfect correlation, she proceeds for the inequality test.
Note that Bob does not know which event and basis will be chosen by Alice to measure the EPR correlation. That's why the test will be a genuine test. Similarly Bob can be sure about the validity of the test just by asking Alice to reveal the results and basis of measurements of the remaining shared particles. Of course this time Bob will not reveal anything but only measure according to the revealed data. It is trivial to mention that the cheating-free test is simply a cheating-free test not experimentally loopholes-free test which is yet to performed. In the light of cheating-free test, the issue of loopholes-free test can be investigated.
Note added: So far we didn't consider noise. Security of our alternative QKD protocols in presence of noise is an open and interesting problem.
